Some aspects of the 1954 agreement caused friction between India and Nepal, the most important of which was the issue of compensation. India was responsible for compensation for the country acquired in Nepal and for all the damage caused by the construction of the ban. She was also responsible for the design, construction and operation of the project. Nepal said the agreement was flawed in terms of the benefits enjoyed by both countries. For irrigation, for example, only 29,000 hectares benefited Nepal, while the containment zone had the capacity to irrigate 1.5 million hectares. Some groups in Nepal have also expressed their displeasure with the disappearance of the territory and the resulting displacement of people who have not been compensated. Control and management of the blockade of India was also seen as a violation of Nepal`s territorial sovereignty. This agreement was reached on 25 April 1954 between the Government of the Kingdom of Nepal (hereafter referred to as the “government”) and the Indian government (hereafter referred to as the “Union”). (ii) The Government has the right to obtain royalties from the Union for stones, gravel and ballasts purchased in the Nepalese area and used for the construction and future maintenance of blocking and other related work at subsequent rates.
Nepal in 2008 is different. This “new” Nepal has undergone changes in domestic policy and a representative agreement on power-sharing. India should be ready to renegotiate the open mind. The Nepalese Prime Minister had made it clear that the state of the damage, which claimed the lives of some 50,000 people, was unprecedented and that, in accordance with the agreement to repair the damage, this must be India`s main task. Although no statement has been made by India, skepticism remains about possible effective cooperation agreements in the field of water management between the two countries. At present, the threat of a possible effective cooperation agreement on water management is still suspect. For India, cooperation with Nepal is the only solution, as the alternatives are limited at home. The shadow of mistrust and mistrust could be costly in the long run for both countries. The devastation caused by the Kosi tidal wave is a grim reminder of the need for a cordial relationship with Nepal and the need to focus on complementary interests and not confrontational issues. Regmee said the border conflict would not have a direct impact on Koshi`s flood management.
The Bihar government cannot slow down flood protection activities because the river will break through the chaos of the state, he said. “But over the years, they have not been able to work effectively. Every year they come and go; they have only partially completed the mandate,” Regmee said. What we have done in the last seven years of the agreement could have minimized the risk of flooding in the Koshi, but we have not yet found a definitive solution. 6. TANTIEMES. – (i) The government receives royalties on energy produced and used in the Indian Union at rates that must be paid by mutual agreement. Assuming there are no royalties for electricity sold in Nepal. “The 1954 agreement, while apparently uneven, reflected an inevitable reality when you consider the status of Nepal at that time,” said Uddhab Pyakurel, an expert on Nepal-India relations and an assistant professor at the University of Kathmandu. “But since then, we have made progress, and we could have done better if we had been able to revise such agreements.” (ii) Details of the project.